Book reviews: self-determination and Kosovo by Chadwick, E
SELF-DETERMINATION, AND KOSOVO 
 
Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008, 144 pp + 2 Annexes + Bibliography, Hardback, Euros 50, ISBN 
978-90-04-17488-7, and  
Contested Statehood:  Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, Oxford, O.U.P., xxviii + 
321 pp (including Bibliography + 2 Appendices + Index), Hardback, $40.00, ISBN 
978-0-19-956616-7,  
both by Dr. MARC WELLER 
 
The right of peoples to self-determination, like the right of revolution from which it 
springs, is a doctrine dating back to time immemorial.  Although packaged and sold 
tightly as a vehicle with which to end colonialism during much of the Cold War, the 
dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has given self-
determination something of a new life, in that the doctrine no longer fits its former 
straightjacket.  For example, roughly one-half of all on-going armed conflicts today 
are purportedly in pursuit of one or other form of self-determination, and the recent 
claims to territorial independence asserted by Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to 
name but a few, have placed the self-determination of peoples squarely in the 
international spotlight once again.  In particular, much doctrinal discussion has been 
generated ever since the non-Serb majority in Kosovo voted for and issued a 
“unilateral declaration of independence” (UDI) from Serbia on 17 February 2008,1 so 
much so that the United Nations General Assembly on 8 October of that same year 
                                       
1
 “Full text:  Kosovo declaration”, 17 February 2008, 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7249677.stm.  
requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) as to the 
legality in international law of the Kosovo UDI.
2
  At the time of writing, the I.C.J. 
proceedings are pending,
3
 but the request itself underscores the deep ambivalence of 
states in the post-Cold War era in relation to issues such as self-determination, 
terrorism, and secession. 
 
     These two succinct monographs by Dr. Weller address these and other topics 
thoroughly and with clarity.
4
  The author is a Reader in International Law and 
International Relations at Cambridge University, and is a Fellow of its Lauterpacht 
Centre for International Law.  He is also Director both of the European Centre for 
Minority Issues and the Cambridge Carnegie Project on the Settlement of Self-
Determination Disputes through Complex Power-Sharing.  He is thus extremely well-
placed to illuminate the phenomenon of self-determination in general, and the many 
new developments in the doctrine during the post-Cold War era specifically.
5
  
Moreover, as Dr. Weller participated in most of the international settlement attempts 
on the future status of Kosovo, including the Carrington Conference, and the 
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Rambouillet and Ahtisaari negotiations, he is well-equipped to provide an analytical, 
eye-witness account of the wider potential for peaceful resolution of such disputes, as 
well as of the causes for failure in high-level international diplomatic interventions 
and engagements concerning secessionist self-determination.   
   Since the advent in 1945 of the United Nations Charter,
6
 the right of peoples to 
exercise their self-determination has held a place for individual group aspiration 
within the structural tensions created between the twin over-arching international 
principles of the maintenance of international peace and security, and of the non-
intervention by states in the internal affairs of each other.
7
  While the principle of self-
determination certainly has a pre-Charter existence,
8
 the United Nations effectively 
elevated the principle, albeit somewhat rhetorically, as a foundation stone on which to 
build future friendly relations between states, and equal rights.  However, while one 
may speak safely today of the acceptance in customary international law of a right to 
self-determination,
9
 and more controversially perhaps, of a “right” in the sense of jus 
cogens,
 
it soon became apparent in the post-war era that there were three main 
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 U.N. Charter Articles 1(2) and 55 (“principle(s) of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples”). 
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U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 2(7), respectively.   
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 E.g., the principle of self-determination was proclaimed in the French Revolution, 
and developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  See also Aaland Islands 
[Spec. Suppl. 1920] 3 LNOJ 3. 
9 E.A. Laing, “The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941 – 1991” [1993] 22 Int.Rel. 209, 
at 222, quoting I. Brownlie in 1973:  “self-determination [is] a legal principle” 
(citation omitted).    
difficulties with the principle of the self-determination of peoples:  which peoples are 
so entitled, which rights may be exercised, and whether a subject people can secede 
territorially.  The Charter is silent on all three points, and states have struggled ever 
since to contain exercises of self-determination within existing state boundaries – a 
task that continues to impose practical challenges to states in that, on the one hand, a 
violent secessionist movement can destroy existing state boundaries, while on the 
other, the state is under a fundamental international duty to keep the peace 
internationally.   
   The solution during much of the Cold War era became an attempt to differentiate 
between “internal” and “external” exercises of self-determination.  Internal self-
determination could be employed to address such issues as good governance, equal 
rights, and forms of devolution.  In contrast, a “right” to exercise external (or 
secessionist) self-determination was cast in territorial terms, and confined legally to 
those peoples inhabiting former colonies and certain non-self-governing territories, as 
such territories are deemed to have a “status separate and distinct from the territory of 
the state administering it”.10  In this way, any putative right to struggle, and to use 
force to achieve secessionist self-determination could be contained within a wider 
anti-colonial agenda, designed as much as for anything else to provide a vehicle to 
certain states with which to gain access more quickly to former colonial resources and 
other trade concessions.  Nonetheless, as former colonies and non-self-governing 
territories slowly regained their independence during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
membership and voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly began to alter, such 
that support for self-determination in U.N.G.A. resolutions slowly gained in 
                                       
10 
U.N.G.A. Resolution 2625 of 24 October 1970, adopted by consensus. 
momentum to favour, first, the right of peoples to use all available means to achieve 
it,
11
 and secondly, the entitlement of “all peoples” to self-determination.12  However, 
while this change in political attitude seemingly provided a means of redress for 
peoples inhabiting territories far beyond so-called “salt-water” imperialism, if not yet 
all subjects of historic conquest or other perceived injustice, case law did not quite yet 
follow suit.   
 
   On the other hand, the I.C.J. may have only ever confirmed the right in the context 
of colonialism, but it has never expressly so confined the principle.
13
  It is thus of note 
that the Kosovo UDI has recently afforded the U.N. General Assembly with a prime 
opportunity to seek advisory guidance from the I.C.J. which might shed light on the 
future practice of entitlements to self-determination, for example, as to whether a 
growing recognition of individual rights entitlements has effected readjustments to the 
former importance of inviolable state territorial boundaries and the non-interference 
principle.  Further, with the end of the Cold War, it has today become arguable that a 
less-centralised international environment is in fact more conducive to a greater pace 
of settlement in many older liberation conflicts, such as that in Northern Ireland, and 
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Legal Consequences for States of the Continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding S.C. Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory 
Opinion) [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16, at 31 (principle of self-determination held applicable 
to all the U.N., specifically, all peoples and territories which “have not yet attained 
independence”).   
this argument forms one thread of Dr. Weller‟s approach in Escaping the Self-
Determination Trap.  It is equally arguable that a more flexible world has instead 
facilitated a new generation of “liberationist” struggles, such as those waged in the 
former territory of Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s.  For this reason, the author seeks 
not only to demonstrate a tendency to failure of the strict, classical approach to self-
determination in resolving liberation struggles peacefully, but further, to present the 
wide range of settlement options which actually do exist, as based on real case 
examples. 
   In Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, the author, in terming the principle a 
“privilege” rather than an enforceable “right”, begins by highlighting the many pitfalls 
of a strict approach by focussing on the alienating effects of a narrow, legalistic 
confinement of self-determination, in that, rather than prevent conflict, a narrow 
approach has instead served to generate it.  For example, the doctrine was “framed to 
apply only in the … narrowly-defined circumstances of salt-water colonialism that 
practically no longer exist”, “there is no secession from secession” (p. 16), and 
“groups fighting … outside of the colonial context are classified as secessionist rebels 
and, potentially, terrorists” (p. 17).  Therefore, in cases arising outside the colonial 
context (Chechnya, the Basque country), or where a sub-unit or minority in control of 
territory wishes to secede again (Sri Lanka, the Philippines), or where the very 
implementation of colonial self-determination is challenged (Mayotte, Eritrea, 
Kashmir), “the international system is structured in such a way that actually assists the 
central state in ensuring their defeat” (p. 17).  Nonetheless, the reality is not always 
(or indeed, ever) so straight-forward, so the adoption of any particular legal approach 
to one or other form of self-determination pertaining “only” to one or other people 
means little if anything to the approximately 30 on-going liberationist conflicts at 
present, the additional 55 or so campaigns that might yet become violent, and a 
further 15 settled conflicts which could re-ignite at any point (p. 13). 
   Accordingly, the author proceeds with some care in Escaping the Self-determination 
Trap, the first sentence of which states “self-determination kills”.  After introducing 
the concept of self-determination itself, and addressing the content of the narrow, 
classical right initially attached to it in the U.N. era, he reviews other, equally viable 
frameworks for exercises of self-determination which not only have proved successful 
in helping to restore both domestic and international peace and security, but further, 
which have come to form a much wider set of options for future reference than one 
might otherwise have thought.  In recognising that most post-Cold War liberation 
conflicts usually range far beyond the colonial context, he posits that those groups 
involved in them are almost-invariably reaching to the rhetoric of self-determination 
to rationalise their violent actions.  In so doing, he refers to case examples which 
elsewhere might be viewed as an overly-broad inclusion within the principle, 
presumably in an effort to locate additional settlement tools.  This broad approach 
does, however, approach the essence of the more timeless goal self-determination 
represents far better than the early post-1945 anti-colonial confines, and 
simultaneously encourages a more penetrating consultation of local and international 
practice to date for purposes of application in less traditional contexts.  The result is a 
very broad range of choice indeed of otherwise-ignored settlement tools.   
   The presented structure of these different state approaches ranges from 
“constitutional” rights and procedures (however unsuccessful in reality, e.g., Burma, 
the U.S.S.R., the former Yugoslavia) (pp. 46 – 58), “remedial” self-determination to 
redress gross state oppression (usually involving the intervention of third states, e.g., 
Kosovo, Bangladesh) (pp. 59 – 69), through to “conditional” forms of self-
determination (triggered by specified external or internal events, e.g., Moldova - 
Gagauzia, Papua New Guinea - Bougainville) (pp. 123 – 125).  He spends several 
short chapters on “deal-making” arrangements, in which a bargain of sorts has been 
struck between the warring sides, such as relinquishing claims to a right to self-
determination in exchange for guarantees of greater autonomy (e.g., Spain - the 
Basque Country, Ukraine - Crimea, China - Hong Kong) (pp. 78 – 90), deferrals of 
substantive settlements (time-buying, essentially, e.g., South Ossetia, Abkhasia, 
Western Sahara, East Timor) (pp. 113 – 118, 126 – 135), and the better-known 
formats of federalisation, confederation, or union in one or other form of regionalism 
(e.g., Chechnya, Quebec, Nagorno-Karabakh) (pp. 91 – 112).  There is also a chapter 
devoted to “effective” entities, which are described as existing either with the 
“consent of the relevant central authorities” (e.g., Malaysia - Singapore, the former 
Czechoslovakia) (p. 70), or, as in Somaliland, where an effective independence, albeit 
one unrecognised by the international community, has lasted for nearly 20 years on 
the basis of prolonged separate existence.   
   Approximately 55 states to date have afforded their recognition of the effectiveness 
of Kosovo‟s UDI (p. 70).  However, even should one or other form of self-
determination become effective de facto, it is noted at several points in Escaping the 
Self-Determination Trap that any notional claim to independence achieved by means 
which violate rules of jus cogens, such as the perpetration of genocide, can never 
attract outside state recognition, whether based on declaratory or constitutive 
recognition factors, as being in violation of international law.  As for the opposite 
situation (independence declared to escape gross oppression), the highly-controversial 
deployment of N.A.T.O. in 1999 to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo‟s 
Albanian population led to on-going U.N. control and administration of all civil and 
military functions in the former Serbian province in order to guide Kosovo eventually 
to its own form of self-government.  Kosovo, having already declared its 
independence (ineffectively) in 1991, certainly made it clear throughout the following 
decade of high-level status negotiations that the eventual restoration of Serbian 
control was undesirable.  However, after the Kosovar UDI in early 2008 (also 
opposed, predictably, by Russia, a long-time Serbian ally), and referral of its legality 
to the I.C.J., Russia became embroiled in an armed conflict between itself and 
Georgia over South Ossetian claims of self-determination,
14
 ostensibly to prevent 
alleged ethnic cleansing by Georgia.  Whether or not utilised by Russia to 
communicate a warning to the I.C.J. of the dangers of Kosovar independence,
15
 any 
suspicion of manipulation makes equally clear that controversial aspects of self-
determination are capable of inhibiting progress between states in many areas of 
international life. 
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Cf. the Council of Europe Independent Fact-Finding Commission on the Conflict in 
Georgia (30 September 2009), para. 11, p. 17 (“[r]ecognition of breakaway entities 
such as … South Ossetia by a third country is … contrary to international law in terms 
of an unlawful interference in the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the affected 
country, which is Georgia”), 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_iiffmgc_report.pdf.  No U.K. legal 
academic was on the Commission. 
   Nonetheless, the “fact” of Kosovo‟s unilateral action in the face of vociferous 
Serbian opposition makes it equally imperative that wider extra-legal dimensions of 
international life are also taken into account when the time arrives to assess what it is 
exactly the self-determination of peoples means, and what it is exactly that existing 
state territorial borders do, if the latter are not simply to demarcate the boundaries of a 
prison.  Due to its breadth of case example, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap is 
ideal for use by students and researchers alike, as well as for students and 
practitioners who wish to grasp the subject rapidly by means of a well-structured and 
completely appropriate approach to conflict-settlement in today‟s world.  The 
monograph would work well as a required text for a self-contained post-graduate 
module in law or international relations, or for use as quick reference.  Many chapters 
are brief and to the point, and provide the necessary background, terms and 
framework of analysis, and case examples with which to illuminate the various 
dimensions of self-determination.  It also has two extremely useful annexes.  Annex I 
outlines the distinct rights claims pertaining to (1) colonial and analogous self-
determination entities, (2) remedial exercises, (3) the constitutional parameters of 
entitlement, (4) effective (unprivileged) entities, and finally (5) unlawful entities 
(violators of jus cogens rules) regarding which third states should afford no 
recognition and work instead to restore the previous situation.  Annex II is longer, and 
lists in bullet point form the many self-determination settlements per continent, and 
the steps taken to achieve them.  There is an extensive bibliography (pp. 171 – 224), 
where the interested reader can obtain further source materials. 
   The author‟s subsequent monograph, Contested Statehood:  Kosovo’s Struggle for 
Independence, deals specifically with the struggle for independence which has been 
waged for two decades by the majority in Kosovo, and is a different kettle of fish 
entirely.  While somewhat longer than the monograph just reviewed, Contested 
Statehood is far from a quick read (and is in smaller font size).  However, in view of 
the specific technicalities entailed by the Kosovo struggle, it is useful to have some 
background knowledge to and basic overview of the events which have transpired in 
the former Yugoslavia since the Cold War ended,
16
 the most recent of current note 
being the UDI highlighted above.  It is also useful to have some acquaintance with 
Public International Law, Constitutional Law, and International Humanitarian Law.  
In overview, Yugoslavia was constructed for largely political imperatives after the 
first world war; from 1941 - 1945 it was bitterly divided within by Axis occupation, 
pockets of armed resistance by nationalist and communist forces to occupation, and a 
civil war.
17
  Once reunified, Yugoslavia‟s first Federal Constitution of 31 January 
1946 provided for six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Serbia, and Montenegro), and two autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina) 
associated with Serbia.  The constituent parts of each administrative unit had 
experienced security-related population transfers over centuries, many of them forced, 
but certainly between 1946 and 1990, overt or blatant nationalist or religious 
tendencies were generally suppressed.   
   Yugoslavia was structured constitutionally with a dual concept of sovereignty:  the 
sovereignty of the republics, and the sovereignty of the “nations”, or peoples.  During 
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17 
In 1945, order was re-imposed by the Serb Partisan Josip Broz Tito, later known as 
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the second world war, national liberation forces allegedly promised Kosovo its self-
determination, but Dr. Weller notes that the decision by Kosovo to associate with 
Serbia as an autonomous province was “expressly conditional upon a „federal‟ Serbia, 
i.e., Serbia, and hence also Kosovo as part of a federal structure” (p. 32), as provided 
for in the 1946 Constitution.  Comprising an area of approximately 10,887 square 
kilometres (p. 28), the Kosovo Albanian population, always the majority, have had a 
long experience of Serbian repression, and it was only with the coming into force of 
the new 1974 Constitution, and a strengthened devolution of power, that Kosovo was 
fully-recognised as a highly-autonomous federal entity with strong representation in 
the federal institutions - a position rather less than a full republic but much more than 
mere autonomy (p. 34).  This latter point is crucial in that, to modern legal 
traditionalists, classical international law requires stability in external state territorial 
boundaries in order to maintain stable inter-state relations, and hence to form the 
bedrock of sovereign equality and peace.  As for internal boundaries, it is Dr. Weller‟s 
position that the federal, highly-autonomous status attributed to Kosovo in the 1974 
Constitution would tend to imply that Kosovo, too, had a similar constitutional right 
to independence as did the other republics at the point of Yugoslavia‟s dissolution 
(passim.), and that accordingly, Serbia could have no possible right constitutionally to 
abrogate Kosovo‟s federal status.     
   Further, and in light of the anti-colonial agenda of the post-1945 era, a former 
federal or similar internal status indicates a definable territory, the importance of 
which cannot be over-estimated should independence be contemplated.  This is the 
doctrine of uti possidetis,
18
 without which there is no arguable “entitlement” to 
secede, as was discovered by the Bosnian Serbs in their attempt to secede from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina after the independence of the latter had been recognised by third 
states.  In other words, any potential “right” to secede territorially from a state beyond 
the colonial context is also made dependent on whether there are pre-existing, 
territorially-defined administrative units of a federal nature, which alone might 
“acquire the character of borders protected by international law”.19  More importantly, 
should such a definable territory exist, it then becomes arguable that a seceding entity 
may request (and obtain) the assistance of outside third states.  Without such territory, 
there has only traditionally been civil war as a means of redress,
20
 at which point, 
international law requires strict non-assistance to either side.  Nonetheless, while it is 
of course true that the key to independence may indeed appear to lie in successful 
revolutionary violence, and while there is no express international law prohibiting 
secession qua secession, it should equally be remembered that the risk of a wider war 
explains the grudging international acknowledgement of a narrowly-construed 
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See Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali [1986] I.C.J. Reports, pp. 554, at 565, in 
which the Court noted that the principle of uti possidetis was not affected by rights to 
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20 As noted by Shaw, “international law treats civil wars as purely internal matters, 
with the possible exception of self-determination conflicts”.  M.N. Shaw, 
International Law (C.U.P., 6th ed., 2008), p. 1148.
  
 
entitlement to self-determination in situations involving only colonialism or at a 
stretch, alien occupation, or racist regimes.  Therefore, the status of Kosovo as both a 
federal entity and a province within a republic rather complicated matters. 
   The devolution of power provided for in the 1974 Constitution had another 
unfortunate side effect:  it facilitated the growth of nationalism and ethnocentrism.  
With grave economic problems emerging by the late 1980s, and the growing decline 
of Communism in Eastern Europe generally, Yugoslavia, and Serbia in particular, 
moved quickly towards major political crisis.  In 1989, Serbia attempted to alter the 
voting equality of the republics, and took action to strip Kosovo of its autonomy.
21
  In 
1990, multi-party elections were held for the first time in the separate republics:  
nationalist parties emerged victorious.  When coupled with the widespread economic 
difficulties and a growing sense of political crisis, it quickly became obvious the 
federation was headed for a break-up, which indeed occurred soon after Serbia 
unilaterally revoked Kosovo‟s autonomous status, an act deemed vital to Serbia‟s 
policy to restore a „Greater Serbia‟.  This threatened wider Serb autocracy, led by the 
Serb nationalist president Slobodan Milosevic, effectively spooked the other 
Yugoslav republics into declaring their independence from the federation (Chapter 3).  
Years of armed conflict ensued, as first Slovenia, then Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and finally Kosovo, declared their independence and left, or 
struggled to do so.  With a “mixed” war (civil and international) erupting in Bosnia-
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1989 was the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of the Blackbirds) on 
15/28 June 1389 (St. Vitus Day), at which Serbian independence was lost to the 
Ottomans until 1878. 
Herzegovina, and the establishment of the I.C.T.Y. in The Hague,
22
 a short N.A.T.O. 
campaign in September 1995 was finally required to stop the ethnic cleansing of the 
Muslim population, effectively forcing an end to hostilities, and the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Accords on 14 December 1995.
23
  
   Milosevic could now direct his attention to the “Kosovo problem”, about which 
international concern had been expressed for some time due to the deteriorating 
situation there.  The key lay in the population mix.  Some 90 percent of the population 
of Kosovo are ethnic Albanian, the Serbs form seven or eight per cent, and the rest are 
comprised of small groups of Gorani, Roma, Bosniaks and others.  In contrast, 
Albanians comprised only a minority overall within Yugoslavia as a whole, so a 
federal status for Kosovo was needed in order to satisfy the Albanian desire to 
preserve their identity, and hence permit their self-determination.  A first Kosovo 
declaration of independence, issued on 22 September 1991, naturally was rejected by 
Serbia.  Kosovo organised a policy of passive resistance, a government in parallel 
under its chosen president, Ibrahim Rugova, and the Kosovo Liberation Army was 
formed (p. 39).  By 16 June 1998, Russian President Boris Yeltsin had invited 
Milosevic to Moscow in order to attempt to discourage further military intervention in 
Kosovo by Serbia, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) of 23 
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September 1998 affirmed that the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace 
and security in the region.  Meanwhile, high-level negotiations to address the situation 
in Kosovo had begun largely after the London Conference in late August 1992 (at 
which Kosovo was all but ignored) (p. 47), with the Hill negotiations (Chapter 6) and 
Holbrook Mission of 1999 (Chapter 7), the Rambouillet Accords of 1999 (Chapter 8), 
and the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Proposal (Chapter 12), and it is largely the detail 
and outcomes of these negotiations which form the overall subject matter of 
Contested Statehood.   
   Throughout the many efforts made by the U.N., the E.U., N.A.T.O., the O.S.C.E., 
sub-groups such as the International Contact Group (the U.S., the U.K., France, 
Germany, Italy, and Russia), humanitarian organisations, N.G.O.s, and others, to 
peacefully resolve the situation between Serbia and Kosovo, Kosovo suffered from its 
uncertain legal personality, and thus from inequality as a negotiating partner (p. 201).  
Serbia resented the external interference in what it considered to be an „internal 
matter‟ (p. 84), while the growing list of atrocities perpetrated against the Kosovars 
demanded international attention and involvement.  Kosovo was often hard-pressed to 
compromise on its own demands, yet whenever a deal seemed to have been struck, 
Serbia (usually with Russian support) could and would counter-propose and/or make 
changes to agreed terms, often at the last minute.  By 20 October 1998, N.A.T.O. was 
once again threatening to use armed force both to stop the perpetration of violence 
against the majority in Kosovo and to “encourage” a more-focussed Serbian 
participation in the international negotiations to resolve the conflict.  Despite these 
many efforts, matters moved finally to a semblance of resolution only after N.A.T.O. 
was again felt forced to launch a bombing campaign on the basis of humanitarian 
intervention in the Spring of 1999, in order to put a stop to the ethnic cleansing of the 
Kosovo Albanian population by Serbia (Chapters 9 and 10).
24
  Milosevic, head since 
15 July 1997 of what was now the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, would in turn find 
himself indicted on 24 May 1999 by the I.C.T.Y., along with four other of the most 
senior leaders of the F.R.Y. and Serbia, on the basis of command responsibility.
25
   
   The N.A.T.O. campaign in 1999 resulted in the U.N. assuming overall control of 
Kosovo.  U.N.S.C. Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999
26
 provided a mandate under 
Charter Chapter VII to a N.A.T.O. peace force under U.N. oversight, with a view to 
„tutelage‟ for eventual self-government.  Kosovo began work on the process of 
“standards before status”, crucial to which was respect for human and minority rights, 
and on drafting a constitution (Chapter 11).  Negotiations led by the International 
Contact Group to solve the issue of Kosovo‟s status recommenced, initially with the 
participation of Serbia and Montenegro, and subsequently, with Serbia alone, after 
Montenegro, too, left the federation.  Milosevic resigned on 6 October 1999, having 
finally acknowledged the victory of Vojislav Kostunica after heavily-rigged elections 
were annulled in Kostunica‟s favour by the Yugoslav Constitutional Court, which 
certainly helped to remove one major impediment to settling the Kosovo peace 
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negotiations.  Even then, however, status could not be agreed.  The U.N. Special 
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari invited the parties to further discussions in Vienna on 12 
January 2006, and presented his plan to the U.N. Security Council on 26 March 2007, 
recommending what in effect was independence in all but name.
27
  After this, it could 
be argued (if not sincerely hoped), the game was up for Serbia, but it was not yet to 
be:  Russia (and other states) objected to the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Proposal, 
began directing personal attacks at the Special Envoy, and alongside Serbia, 
demanded a new round of negotiations.  No doubt in a spirit of “generous 
negotiation”, the U.S., E.U. and Russia commenced by 9 August a further 120 days of 
negotiations, extended again until 7 December.  With the presentation of their final 
report to the U.N. Security Council, the E.U. apparently indicated it would „promptly‟ 
recognise a Kosovo UDI, which Kosovo proceeded to issue on 17 February 2008.   
   Thus it is that despite the many opportunities afforded to Serbia over the last two 
decades to settle the dispute with Kosovo, in particular, and ahead of the latter‟s 
claimed independence, for example, by respecting Kosovo demands for self-
determination and restoring its high-level autonomy, “Serbia‟s actions in relation to 
the crisis were not just one, but possibly two steps out of sync” (p. 280).  To no small 
extent, Serbian foot-dragging and general intransigence reminds this reviewer of 
Bertolt Brecht‟s play Mother Courage, in which the wilful blindness of a self-
obsessed mother led to the loss of her children, her means of living – all, in fact, 
except herself, as she chased the profits of war.  Be that as it may, Contested 
Statehood provides a fascinating insider‟s account of what no doubt will remain a 
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topic of huge interest to and debate for many years to come among those with an 
interest in “matters Kosovo”, not least due to the uncertainties at this point of the 
outcome of the advisory proceedings before the I.C.J.  As noted earlier, Dr. Weller is 
extremely well-placed to provide such an account, and has done so in a highly-
detailed and well-resourced manner, along with the occasional leitmotif note provided 
as to the demeanour and bona fides of certain personalities, the décor and 
entertainment provided at certain chateaux or conference centres, etc.  He is 
undoubtedly pro-Kosovo, but provides frequent, and easily digestible, digressions into 
the relevant international law, such as the on-going debate surrounding humanitarian 
intervention, the legality of the N.A.T.O. threats and use of force, and the activities 
and contributions of international institutions and N.G.O.s alike.   
   This monograph is unlikely to be used as a textbook, but would certainly be useful 
in terms of reference for students, researchers, academics or practitioners in the fields 
of international law, politics, history, international relations, and government.  There 
is in particular an overwhelming amount of detail regarding the structure and 
operation of this or that framework agreement or proposal, the counter-proposals and 
compromises, and those otherwise “final” documents which never actually were.  It is 
not always an “easy read”, as Dr. Weller adopts a more themed approach (history, 
human rights violations, shuttle diplomacy, the law on secession and the use of force, 
etc.), than a strictly chronological one, but this reviewer is all-too-aware of the 
necessity to weave back and forth when attempting to pick up the disparate and 
conflicting threads of accounts of events in the Balkans.  Further, students of history 
for example are familiar with synchronous chronology charts, which detail events 
occurring simultaneously at any given point in time, and something similar would 
perhaps prove beneficial to such works as Contested Statehood.  Having said that, a 
short bullet-point chronology and the detailed table of contents were invaluable 
throughout, as were the index and extensive bibliography.  In conclusion, the slice of 
time addressed in Contested Statehood illustrates the political cauldron the Balkans 
has long represented; if the problems, challenges, and troubled history there are not to 
plague the region forever, such contemporary accounts as the struggle for Kosovo 
expounded in Contested Statehood, and the ways of seeing them provided in Escaping 
the Self-Determination Trap, need to continue to be written, and read.   
E. CHADWICK* 
